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During Britain’s industrialization, Parliament operated a forum where rights to land and resources
could be reorganized. This venue enabled landholders and communities to exploit economic opportunities
that could not be accommodated by the inflexible rights regime inherited from the past. In this essay,
historical evidence, archival data, and statistical analysis demonstrate that Parliament increased the
number of acts reorganizing property rights in response to increases in the demand for such acts. Tests
with placebo groups confirm the robustness of this result. This evidence indicates that Parliament responded
elastically to changes in the public’s demand for reorganizing property rights. Parliament’s efforts
to adapt property rights to modern economic conditions may have accelerated Britain’s economic ascent
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… laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that 
becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths 
discovered and manners and opinions change, with the change of circumstances, institutions 
must advance also to keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still 
the coat which fitted him when a boy as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of 








Ronald Coase’s seminal articles, “The Problem of Social Cost (1960)” and “The 
Lighthouse in Economics (1974),” examine property rights in nineteenth-century Britain. The 
British system, Coase contends, was flexible and efficient, a contention illustrated with examples 
from the common law of industrial torts and Parliament’s policies towards lighthouses. A large 
literature follows Coase’s lead and describes the common law’s role regulating property rights, 
particularly rights to real estates, but little scholarship discusses Parliament’s influence over 
rights to land and resources.  
Recent research addresses that lacuna in the literature (Bogart and Richardson, 2008, 
2009). Parliament played a pivotal role in the evolution of equitable estates, a property right 
superimposed above real estates and dictating who received revenues arising from land and 
resources. This essay extends that insight to the spectrum of legal arrangements regulating the 
cultivation of land, utilization of resources, and investment in infrastructure.  
Addressing these issues requires understanding property rights in pre-industrial Britain. 
Britain’s pre-industrial property-rights regime posed problems for people trying to reallocate 
resources towards more productive uses, particularly opportunities arising from technologies 
unanticipated in the distant past. Holders of equitable estates could neither mortgage, nor lease, 
                                                 
1   Thomas Jefferson’s letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816. This quote is inscribed on the south-eastern 
interior wall of the Jefferson Memorial in Washington, DC.   2
nor sell much of the land under their control. Holders under many types of tenures could only 
transfer property to particular persons or members of a local community. Residents in common 
field villages often had to keep land in traditional uses. Residents could neither utilize resources 
in new ways, nor improve infrastructure, nor repackage rights without reaching agreements with 
all other parties possessing interests in a parcel, and such agreements could not, in most cases, be 
enforced by law, but could, in many instances, be challenged through courts. 
Britain’s pre-industrial property-rights system also inhibited localities from providing 
public goods, particularly those extending beyond the bounds of traditional communities or those 
necessitated by the expansion of commerce and cities. Communities lacked mechanisms for 
raising revenues and powers of eminent domain. Communities struggled to overcome free-
riding, which inhibited the provision of public goods, and hold-outs, who withheld resources 
needed for public projects unless paid exorbitant sums. Market transactions might have 
alleviated these inefficiencies, but in most cases, the necessary transfers could not be 
consummated and the requisite contracts could not be enforced because of the restrictive nature 
of the rights regime, which valued tradition and stability above innovation and flexibility. 
These problems persisted until Parliament embraced novel ideas concerning property and 
established procedures for processing petitions from groups hoping to reorganize rights to land 
and resources. These procedures enabled Parliament to review requests from individuals, 
families, and communities, and after considering the interests of all concerned and the general 
public, rewrite rules regarding the use of land and resources. Parliament enshrined these accords 
in three types of acts: estate, statutory authority, and enclosure. Estate acts altered the rights of 
individuals and families; eliminated restrictions on the uses to which property could be put; 
authorized the sale, mortgage, and leasing of land; and facilitated the enforcement of contracts.   3
Acts establishing statutory authorities created new organizations that built, operated, and 
maintained infrastructure and public services. Statutory authorities received new rights, such as 
the authority to collect tolls, levy taxes, issue debt, and purchase land. These rights superseded 
traditional rights, such as burgesses’ right to travel throughout the realm free from tax and toll, 
which was enshrined in town charters and the Magna Carta. Enclosure acts disbanded 
collectively-managed common-field villages and assigned to individuals rights to particular 
pieces of property. Enclosure acts also shifted commonly-held agricultural land to new uses, 
such as the construction of housing and workshops near growing towns and cities. Acts of all 
three types embodied the public’s desire to reorganize rights and to reallocate resources towards 
new uses. 
A key question concerning Parliament’s role in the property system is: did Parliament 
supply legislation that reorganized property rights elastically, in the sense that when the public’s 
demand for legislation expanded, the quantity of legislation rose in response, while the cost 
remained reasonable and stable? Or, did Parliament supply legislation inelastically, indicating 
that the political system dictated the pace of reform, perhaps due to desires to extract economic 
rents, protect social classes, or restrain change? 
This essay demonstrates that Parliament supplied property rights elastically. The 
demonstration begins with evidence describing Parliament’s procedures for reorganizing rights. 
The evidence indicates that Parliament’s process was rapid, affordable, and consensual. The 
demonstration continues with a series of statistical tests. The tests compare the annual number of 
acts that reorganized property rights with variables that influenced the public’s desire to 
reorganize rights and Parliament’s willingness to supply the requisite legislation. The public’s 
demand depended upon the costs and benefits of reorganizing rights. The benefits of   4
reorganization depended on returns to constructing infrastructure, which varied with the cost of 
investment and the health of the economy. A good proxy for the former was the ex-post real 
interest rate. A good proxy for the latter was the volume of international trade. 
Our statistical tests regress changes in the annual number of acts reorganizing property 
rights on changes in the volume of trade, the real interest rate, and an array of additional 
variables that influenced the public’s desire to reorganize rights and Parliament’s ability to pass 
the requisite legislation. Coefficients recovered from these regressions reflect short-term changes 
in legislative output caused by fluctuations in factors influencing the demand for reorganization 
and the supply of legislation. These regressions also account for econometric issues – such as 
non-stationarity and heterogeneity– that complicate the process of drawing inferences from time-
series data. Additional robustness checks – including placebo groups and instrumental variables 
– allow clear conclusions to be drawn from the correlations in the data. The placebo groups 
consist of acts processed using the same procedures as acts reorganizing property rights, but 
which did not alter rights to land and resources. The instrumental variables consist of climatic 
conditions conducive to crop cultivation – as recorded in the width of tree rings – for Great 
Britain and its principal trading partners. These instrumental variables clearly demonstrate the 
direction of causation. 
The rest of this essay elucidates our endeavor. Section 2 provides details about 
Parliament’s process for reorganizing rights to land and resources. Section 3 describes the 
quantitative evidence that we analyze. Section 4 describes our statistical methods. Section 5 
presents empirical results. Section 6 discusses the implications of our analysis. Parliament 
supplied legislation for reorganizing property rights elastically. When demand for reorganization 
rose, the quantity of legislation rose as well. When demand contracted, the quantity contracted.   5
Parliament’s actions enabled Britain to reorganize property rights gradually and peacefully 
during the century following the Glorious Revolution. This reorganization could have 
contributed to Britain’s economic growth and the onset of industrialization. 
 
 
2. Acts that Reorganized Rights to Land and Resources 
This section describes estate, statutory authority, and enclosures acts and Parliament’s 
procedures for passing them. These three types of acts possessed a common theme: they relaxed 
constraints on the use of land and resources. They did this in varying ways. Some of these acts 
created new rights. Others altered or annulled old rights. Some created new organizations, such 
as turnpike trusts. Others disbanded existing organizations, including ancient entities, such as 
village councils and manorial courts. 
 
3.1 Estates  acts 
Estate acts enabled holders of property to take some action prohibited by the rules under 
which they had inherited their land. Estate acts were necessary because the inheritance system 
limited estate holder’s power over their property, particularly the ability to sell or lease land. 
These restrictions adhered to the wishes of the deceased (who bequeathed the property to their 
descendents) to protect the interests of dependents and heirs and to preserve a family’s estate for 
future generations (English and Saville, 1983, pp. 19-21). This system of inheritance, known as 
strict settlement, solidified during the seventeenth century and prevailed until the nineteenth 
century. A settlement was a generic name for a property transaction and for the documents 
created in its consummation. While estimates vary, at the peak, at least one-quarter and as much 
as three-fourths of land in England was held through strict settlements (English and Saville, 
1983, pp. 11-12, 30).    6
Three features of settlements generated a need for Parliamentary involvement. First, 
without an act of Parliament, holders of settled estates could only change the terms of the 
settlement when their heir came of age (i.e. reached the age of 21). Then, the holder and heir 
(typically father and son) could join forces and amend the settlement via the process of common 
recovery. Limited life spans meant that settlements could be changed only infrequently. A family 
might wait decades (or generations) for an heir to come of age and for the holder and heir to 
reach an agreement about restructuring the estate. 
Second, settlements restricted the uses to which land could be put. Holders of a settled 
estate (who were just life tenants) could grant neither leases lasting beyond their lives nor leases 
from which they benefited at the expense of their heirs (such as leases in which tenants paid 
lump sums up front in return for concessions). Holders could seldom sell, swap, or mortgage 
property under their control. Holders could not alter property, even if they considered the 
alterations to be an improvement, without risking legal suits. The removal of trees, hedges, and 
buildings; the mining of minerals, quarries, and peat bogs; and the conversion of arable lands 
into pasture (or vice versa) could be considered waste, since these actions converted permanent 
resources into current income. All those who benefited from such actions could be liable for 
damages if dependents or heirs claimed to be harmed. Courts allowed sales, exchanges, 
mortgages, improvements, and long-term leases only if the settlement contained specific clauses 
authorizing such actions. Settlements written in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 
seldom provided such powers, although as the eighteenth century progressed and as the law 
concerning settlements became increasingly sophisticated, settlements tended to provide broader 
powers. 
Three, conducting transactions and enforcing contracts on settled land could be costly,   7
uncertain, and insecure. Settlements were long, complex documents, often unpunctuated and 
repetitious. Interpreting settlements required experience, skill, detailed knowledge of the 
document, and a large library of property laws, precedents, and legal texts estimated at 674 
volumes in 1826 (English and Saville, 1983, p. 18). Settlements were not part of the public 
record. Copies of the deeds were usually held by the settlers, trustees, and lawyers. Settlements 
had to be consulted before taking out mortgages, drawing up leases, or completing sales, because 
if the settlement did not specifically authorize a transaction, the transaction could be voided. 
Ambiguities in settlements often deterred individuals from acting for fear that the transactions 
would be disputed (Bogart and Richardson 2009a). 
  Estate acts solved these problems. Estate acts facilitated the enforcement of contracts by 
clarifying permissible transactions and the rights of pertinent parties. Estate acts authorized 
actions previously prohibited by settlements such as the mortgaging of property, cutting of old-
growth timber, and mining of ores and minerals. Estate acts authorized the sale and leasing of 
land. The authorization of sales and leases was one of the most significant economic effects of 
estate acts, since large tracts of English land were exposed to market forces.  
 
3.2 Statutory Authority Acts 
Statutory authority acts fostered the construction, improvement, and maintenance of 
infrastructure and social services. Statutory acts focused on particular topics. Transportation acts 
promoted roads, bridges, river navigation, ports, canals, and railways. Urban improvement acts 
provided for street paving, gas lighting, garbage collection, sewage extraction, water provision, 
and police protection. Government building acts fostered the construction of prisons, 
courthouses, and county administrative offices. Poor relief acts provided assistance for the poor 
and encouraged the construction of workhouses. Court of small request acts established legal   8
forums for adjudicating credit contracts valued at less than 40 shillings. Lighthouse acts 
authorized the construction of new lighthouses. The history of statutory authorities has been 
documented by several scholars.  
Statutory authority acts were necessary because existing governmental entities—parishes, 
counties, boroughs, and sewer commissions—lacked appropriate fiscal devices and clear powers 
of eminent domain. River navigation provides an illustration. In the early seventeenth century, 
most tidal rivers were under the authority of Commissions of Sewers. Commissions could 
compel landowners to cleanse waterways and could tax land along riverbanks to pay for upkeep, 
but not tax individuals who traveled on the river or drank its waters and could not purchase land 
along a waterway or divert its course. These limitations kept sewer commissions from improving 
and extending navigable waterways (Willan 1964).  
To encourage the improvement and expansion of infrastructure, Parliament passed 
statutory authority acts that established non-profit organizations whose trustees served without 
remuneration or for-profit corporations whose directors purchased shares and profited from their 
investments (Webb and Webb 1963). To these new organizations, statutory authority acts 
granted an array or rights. One was the right to levy user-fees and/or raise revenue through other 
means. A turnpike act, for example, authorized a trust operating a turnpike to levy tolls on road-
users and claim labor (or the equivalent in taxes) from inhabitants along the road. The tolls 
marked a significant departure from the existing system, in which parishes paid for road 
improvements with local labor and property taxes, and in which individuals possessed the right 
of free passage. Trustees also received the right to issue debt and equity. The bonds were secured 
by the tolls. If interest payments fell into arrears, bondholders could seize toll revenues (Albert 
1972).   9
Acts gave statutory authorities the right to purchase land along a route’s right of way and 
legal procedures for doing so. Organizations initially negotiated with landowners. If the parties 
could not agree on a price for a plot of land, the organization could appeal to a commission that 
could compel the landowner to sell at a price that the commission determined to be fair and 
reasonable. These procedures provided the legal origin for modern laws concerning eminent 
domain. 
 
3.3 Enclosure Acts 
Enclosure acts reorganized rights to property, usually in open-field agricultural villages. 
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, approximately one-quarter of the arable land in 
England lay in such villages, where residents shared rights to communal assets, such as water, 
pasture, and woods. Villagers also shared rights in large open fields, which served as pasture 
during fallow periods and as cropland during the growing season. The cropland was divided 
among the residents, who possessed the right to grow grain on particular plots scattered 
throughout the fields and intermingled with those of their neighbors. Villagers managed these 
collective assets, such as the open arable fields, through village institutions, including customary 
laws and manorial courts. 
The problems of open fields have long been studied by scholars.
2 Collective decision-
making and communal rights impeded investments in improvements, the adoption of new 
techniques, and the conversion of land to new uses. Scattered plots wasted time and resources. 
Common pastures encouraged over-grazing and hindered breeding.  
Parliamentary enclosure acts replaced collective ownership of common resources with 
individual ownership of particular plots of land, and replaced collective management through 
                                                 
2 For a sample of works see Tate (1967, 1978), Turner (1980, 1984), Wordie (1983), Allen (1992), Clark (1998, 
2001), and Richardson (2005).    10
village institutions by individual management of personal estates. An enclosure act appointed a 
commission to devise the plan of enclosure and implement the terms of the act. The commission 
employed surveyors to draw a map of the village with its open fields and strips, tofts and crofts, 
waste and pasture, and other physical features. The surveyors recorded the holders of rights to all 
of these assets. At a series of public meetings, holders of land (and all other rights in the village) 
advanced claims as to what they should receive under the new arrangements. The commissioners 
decided on the validity of these claims. After they made their decisions, the surveyors created a 
map of the new village, displaying the new features, such as fields, roads, fences, and irrigation 
channels, and the owners of each. 
 
3.4  The Process of Passing Acts 
The passage of estate, statutory authority, and enclosure acts required time, resources, 
and expertise. Individuals and communities had to organize and submit proposals. Legislators 
had to review proposals and counterproposals from opposing interests. Clerks had to enscribe 
acts on parchment and ensure they contained language enforceable in courts. 
Procedures for passing estate, statutory authority, and enclosure acts were standardized in 
the early 1700s and operated with minor adjustments through the late nineteenth century 
(Clifford 1968, Williams 1945). An estate act began with a petition from an individual or family 
desiring to change the rules regarding their estate. A statutory authority act also began with a 
petition, usually from a community stating a problem, such as insufficient road capacity, or an 
entrepreneur proposing a project, such as a canal or railway. An enclosure act began with a series 
of public meetings during which residents of a village debated the issue and drafted a petition 
signed by a sufficient share (typically four-fifths) possessing rights to the property under 
consideration.   11
Petitions could be submitted to either House of Parliament. A Parliamentary committee 
investigated the merits of a petition. In the Commons, committees consisted of members of 
Parliament (MPs) who had knowledge of the individuals or localities involved. In the Lords, 
committees consisted of Lords of Parliament (Peers) with knowledge of the issue at hand, 
although it was standard practice to let any peer participate if they desired to do so. If the 
committee deemed a petition appropriate, the petition became a bill that was read at least three 
times to the entire chamber and publicly disseminated, ensuring that all interested individuals 
learned of the legislation. During the readings and subsequent committee meetings, members 
could suggest amendments and pertinent parties could submit counterproposals. After the initial 
House approved the bill, it was sent to the other House, where it once again underwent public 
review. After passing both Houses, Parliament submitted the bill for royal assent. Then, the bill 
became law. 
Repeated public notice ensured that individuals with vested interests knew about relevant 
legislation. Interested individuals often appeared before Parliament to support or oppose bills. 
Estate bills could be opposed by any beneficiary, creditor, or claimant of the estate. Opposition 
might come from immediate family members, distant relatives, trustees, bankers, or legal 
representatives. Enclosure bills could be opposed by anyone with rights to the lands under 
consideration or with interests in the village about to be reorganized. Opposition might come 
from tenants, small holders, or other parties who thought that they deserved more compensation 
for the rights that the legislation would extinguish. Statutory authority bills could be opposed by 
a broader range of persons, such as neighboring landowners, nearby towns, and rival operators. 
Opponents could air their grievances if called as witnesses by the committee. Opponents could 
also submit counter-petitions that amended the original legislation or offered alternative   12
proposals. Some bills aroused so much opposition that they failed to become acts. Others became 
law, but only after amendments appeased opposition.  
The cost of proposing and opposing legislation appears to have been moderate and stable. 
Petitioners paid fees to the clerks of Parliament and officers of the Houses of Commons and 
Lords. Standing orders dictated the schedule of fees (Clifford 1968, pp. 716-751). The fees 
increased for longer bills with multiple provisions or when multiple parties were involved. On 
several occasions, Parliament debated the efficacy of the fee schedule. Leaders of the Commons 
advocated the fee-for-service approach on the grounds that fees encouraged clerks and officers to 
work diligently. In 1821, a select committee argued that fees should be retained because they 
“stimulate[d] the exertions of [officers] during periods of accumulated business (Clifford 1968, 
p. 741).” MPs and Peers received no direct compensation for introducing and advocating bills, 
but politicians may have been rewarded indirectly, by receiving electoral support, payments in 
kind, patronage, or side payments. Petitioners also paid lawyers or ‘parliamentary agents’ to 
prepare the paperwork and guide their bills through Parliament. Agents presented arguments, 
gathered evidence, and prepared witnesses for committee proceedings. Agents’ fees amounted to 
50 to 80 percent of the cost of obtaining an act (Great Britain, 1833).  
The preponderance of material pertaining to petitions indicates that the process was 
accessible, affordable, and predictable. Whether the political process operated as advertised is, of 
course, a testable hypothesis. The subsequent sections of this essay describe the historical data 
and statistical methods needed to conduct such a test. 
 
3. Data  
The Parliamentary Archive maintains a computerized catalogue, Portcullis, which 
indicates the clerical title, calendar year, regal year, and parliamentary session for all acts passed   13
since the sixteenth century.
3 Clerks inscribed clerical titles on the exterior of a roll of parchment 
containing the full text of an act when Parliament reviewed the original legislation. The clerical 
title summarized the act, usually in a concise paragraph containing enough information for the 
clerks to identify the act and its principal provisions amidst thousands of similar pieces of 
parchment, without opening the rolls to read the full text. 
Earlier papers explain processes for converting the clerical title of every act of Parliament 
into a vector of variables (Bogart and Richardson, 2006, 2009b).
4 Figure 1 plots the annual 
number of acts dealing with estates, statutory authorities, and enclosures from 1700 to 1830. 
Estate acts were the most common type of legislating altering property rights in the early 1700s. 
Statutory authority acts increased in number throughout the century. Enclosure acts became 
common from 1760 to 1820. The number of all of these acts varied greatly from year to year. 
The top-half of Table 1 describes the series on estate acts. Row (a) refers to the series 
indicating the total number of estate acts passed each year. Rows (b) and (c) describe time series 
indicating the annual number of estate acts that authorized the sale or lease of property. Our 
analysis emphasizes estate acts authorizing sales and leases because these acts placed land long 
bound by the fetters of the past onto the market.  
Rows (e) through (h) of Table 1 describe the data that serve as a comparison (or placebo) 
group for estate acts. Marriage acts permitted individuals to marry and/or divorce in 
contravention of secular and religious statutes. Naturalization acts provided foreign-born 
denizens with the rights of native-born citizens. Office acts appointed individuals to positions in 
the royal household, courts of law, executive agencies, and other positions that provided 
                                                 
3   http://www.portcullis.parliament.uk. The clerical titles within Portcullis were first published in two nineteenth 
century compilations of Parliamentary legislation, Statutes of the Realm (Great Britain, 1800) and Statutes at 
Large (Great Britain, 1807), which were computerized during the 1990s. 
4 Our quantitative compilation of acts builds on a large literature which counts and categorizes acts of Parliament. 
See Langford (1991), Hoppit (1996), Hoppit and Innes (1997), and Innes (1997) for recent contributions.   14
government-funded livings. Important similarities existed between these marriage, 
naturalization, and office acts (collectively called non-estate private acts) and the estate acts 
examined in the top of the table. When processing all of these acts, Parliament followed common 
procedures. Similarities also existed in the clientele that requested these acts A key feature, 
however, distinguishes estate and non-estate private acts. The value of estate acts varied with 
economic conditions that influenced the costs and benefits of reorganizing rights to land. The 
value of marriage, naturalization, and office acts did not. 
The top-half of Table 2 describes statutory authority acts. Row (a) indicates the annual 
number of statutory authority acts passed each year. Row (b) indicates the annual number of acts 
pertaining to transportation, principally roads, canals, harbors, rivers, bridges, and railways. Row 
(c) indicates the annual number of acts pertaining to urban improvements, principally the 
provision of water, sewers, market infrastructure, public buildings, gas lighting, garbage 
collection, church maintenance, courts of small request, poor relief, prison construction, and 
police protection. Columns (7) and (12) indicate whether the series are stationary, as determined 
by an Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test. While several series are non-stationary in levels, all of the 
series are stationary in differences. 
The bottom-portion of Table 2 describes the placebo group for statutory authority acts: 
government finance acts. These acts dealt with national government expenditure and taxation. 
Most pertained to excise, customs, and land taxes; purchasing ships; provisioning of military 
forces, and constructing military fortifications. Like statutory authorities, these acts financed the 
provision of public goods, and their passage through Parliament required balancing local and 
broader interests. Unlike statutory authority acts, however, demand for these acts depended 
largely on the dictates of foreign affairs and little on the costs and benefits of reorganizing rights   15
to land and resources. 
Table 3 describes enclosure acts. The last row of the table describes the placebo group, 
amendments to enclosure acts. Amendments serve as an illuminating comparison because their 
passage followed procedures identical to initial enclosure acts, but demand for amendments 
arose primarily after random instances when errors crept into original legislation during the long 
process of drafting and passing bills. 
The accuracy of the data depicted in Tables 1 through 3 depends upon our ability to 
accurately determine the year in which acts passed. We can do that with confidence for years 
after 1762. For the early part of our sample period, a minor complication arises. A convention 
dated all acts passed by a session of Parliament as if they passed on the opening day of the 
session. This convention lingered from an earlier period when Parliament met infrequently at 
royal request and handled a limited volume of business in a short time period. After 1689, 
Parliament met annually. Sessions began in the fall, usually in the months of October, 
November, or December; lasted throughout the winter; and adjourned in the spring. These 
conventions complicate the dating of acts for the Parliaments of 1714-1715, 1751-1752, and 
1760-1761. In these years, the monarch died, and/or Parliament opened late. In 1714, for 
example, Queen Anne died. George I assumed the throne. His ascension delayed the opening of 
Parliament until January of 1715. This parliament adjourned in the spring and another opened on 
schedule during the next fall. So, in the year 1715, the conventional dating method assigned the 
acts passed in two Parliamentary sessions – the winters 1714-15 and 1715-16 – to one calendar 
year, 1715. We correct for this confusion by assigning dummy variables to the years in which 
Parliament did not meet and the years in which Parliament met twice. In the example above, a   16
dummy is included for 1714, 1715, and 1716.
5  
Table 4 lists the right-hand-side variables in our regression analysis. Rows (a) and (b) 
refer to the key explanatory variables, the real interest rate and the volume of foreign trade. The 
real interest rate determined the cost of investment and rate of inter-temporal exchange, which 
were principal factors determining the returns from reorganizing property rights. Our real interest 
rate is the nominal interest rate, measured as the yield on long-term government bonds, known as 
2½ % consols from Neal (1990), minus inflation, measured as a three-year moving average of 
the percentage change in Clark’s (2001) consumer price index.
6 The volume of foreign trade was 
linked to aggregate economic activity, which was a principal determinant of revenues earned 
from improving infrastructure and reallocating resources towards more productive uses. The 
volume of trade also measured the health of the industrial and mercantile sectors relative to 
agriculture. Our measure of the volume of foreign trade, like most scholars, is the sum of the 
official value of imports plus exports (Mitchell, 1988). The official values reflect changes in the 
quantity of imports and exports weighted by a particular set of prices fixed at the outset of the 
eighteenth century. Rows (c) through (i) summarize the control variables including years when 
the monarch died, when a new prime minister assumed office, when Parliamentary elections 
occurred, when Britain was at war, when Britain suffered disease epidemics, and when Britain 
changed the structure of its land tax system. The land tax rate is in shillings per acre.  
Rows (j) through (o) summarize indices of climatic conditions derived from timber 
growth rates. Tree rings are ideal instruments because they were driven by annual weather 
patterns which were clearly exogenous. Tree rings reveal year-to-year fluctuations in conditions 
                                                 
5 We have also corrected for this by assigning legislation to the years in which they appear to have been passed and 
by running all of our regressions only for the years of 1763 to 1830, for which we can precisely date all acts. Our 
conclusions remain robust regardless of the way in which we date acts from these idiosyncratic years. 
6 From 1700 to 1729, the dividend yield on Million Bank stock is used for the yield on long term government bonds.  
See Neal (1990) and Global Financial Data for more discussion of UK interest rates in the early eighteenth century.   17
conducive to cultivation, which had large effects on trade patterns and interest rates in an 
economy dominated by agriculture. Tree-ring indices exist for Britain and several of its largest 
trading partners. A series from Belgium reveals climatic conditions in the Low Countries, the 
agricultural lands adjoining the North Sea and English Channel, and the Rhine River basin. A 
series from the Southern French Alps reflects climatic conditions in the Mediterranean basin, 
particularly the productive and densely populated regions along the Rhone River and in Northern 
Italy. A series from Pomerania reflects climatic conditions in the grain exporting regions in 
Eastern Europe and near the Baltic Sea. A series from New York and Virginia reflect climatic 
conditions in England’s American colonies, particularly the northern regions exporting 
foodstuffs, like fish and grain, and the southern colonies exporting cash crops, such as cotton and 
tobacco.  
Graphing the data described in Tables 1 through 4 reveals correlations between the 
explanatory and dependent variables. A key correlation appears between changes in interest rates 
and changes in legislation reorganizing property rights. Figures 2 through 4 illustrate this 
correlation. For each figure, the top panel shows that the number of acts increased when the 
interest rate fell. The bottom panel shows that this correlation did not exist for the placebo 
groups. These patterns reveal a clear correlation between changes in the demand to reorganize 
property rights and changes in the number of reorganizations approved by Parliament. The next 
section describes statistical methods that yield clear interpretations of these correlations. 
 
4. Methods 
  This section builds upon research which explores the public’s demand and the political 
system’s supply of property rights.
7 Formalizing this intuition yields equations that can be 
                                                 
7 Anderson and Hill (1975), Libecap (1989), Alston, Libecap, and Mueller (1999), and Alston and Mueller (2004).   18
estimated with clear interpretations and salutary statistical properties. An appendix completes the 
mathematical details of this exercise. This section explains what the estimating equation reveals 
about the patterns in the evidence. 
  The estimating equation is 
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where ΔAt is the change in the number of acts passed by Parliament from year t-1 to t. Δxi,t-1 is the 
change from year t-2 to t-1 in the i
th variable that affects returns from reorganizing property 
rights and thus shifts the demand for legislation. αi is the coefficient on the i
th demand-shift 
variable. Δzj,t-1 is the change from t-2 to t-1 in the j
th variable that alters Parliament’s productivity 
and thus shifts the supply of legislation. βj is the coefficient for the j
th supply-shift variable. εt is 
an error term. Explanatory variables are lagged to capture the time necessary to respond to 
changing circumstances, prepare petitions, debate bills, and pass acts.  
  This specification is derived from a standard supply and demand model. In such a model, 
the effect of a shift in demand depends upon the elasticity of supply. If supply is inelastic, then 
shifts in demand have little (or no) impact on the equilibrium quantity, but a large impact on the 
equilibrium price. As the elasticity of supply increases, shifts in demand have a larger impact on 
quantity and smaller impact on price. The elasticity of supply is a key issue. The elasticity of 
supply indicates Parliament’s response to constituents’ requests. If supply was elastic, then when 
constituent’s desired to reorganize property rights, Parliament allowed them to do so (as the 
documentary evidence indicates). If supply was inelastic, then Parliament based its decisions 
about reorganizing rights on concerns other than economic efficiency – concerns such as 
extracting economic rents, protecting social classes, or restraining modernization. In our model, 
determining the elasticity of supply involves the traditional hypothesis test for statistical   19
significance of αi, the coefficients on the demand-shift variables Δxi,t-1. If the null hypothesis that 
these coefficients equal zero can be rejected, then the supply curve cannot be perfectly inelastic. 
As the demand-shift coefficients αi increase relative to the supply-shift coefficients βj, the 
elasticity of supply increases.  
This estimating equation arises because of the nature of the data. Data exists on the 
number of acts that Parliament approved each year, on factors that influenced Parliament’s 
productivity, and on factors that influenced the public’s demand for legislation. Data does not 
exist on the cost of passing acts, the way that effort put into the legislative process generated the 
supply of acts, and the exact nature of the relationship between macroeconomic variables and the 
aggregate demand for acts. This existing data and standard assumptions about human behavior 
and institutional organization illuminate short-run relationships between the dependent and 
explanatory variables in the vicinity of the equilibrium outcome. 
Our estimation method is related to other papers in the literature which link the level of 
real interest rates with the number of enclosure or statutory authority acts in given year (Albert 
1972; Crafts 1977). Our approach improves on this methodology by analyzing the correlation 
between changes in real interest rates or trade and changes in the number of property rights acts. 
Analyzing changes (a.k.a. first differences) in the data is sensible, because this is the 
specification that arises from a supply and demand model. Analyzing differences is also 
necessary, because much of the data that we analyze trends over time. Statistical phenomena 
frequently generate spurious correlations between trending time-series. Analyzing differences 
ensures the correlations that we detect arose for real rather than statistical reasons. 
Earlier papers also failed to account for unobserved explanatory variables and the 
direction of causation. Our method accounts for both of these phenomena. We control for   20
unobserved explanatory variables using placebo groups. It is possible that our regressions do not 
control for an unobserved factor correlated with both an independent variable (such as the real 
interest rate) and the number of acts reorganizing rights to land and resources (our dependent 
variable). The exclusion of this unobserved variable might make it appear as if the real interest 
rate influenced the demand for acts, when in actuality, the excluded variable was the source of 
the correlation. Placebo groups indicate whether correlations existed between our independent 
variables and acts that did not reorganize rights to land and resources. If such correlations 
existed, then our regressions may reveal spurious, rather than real, relationships. 
Our estimation method determines the direction of causation using instrumental 
variables. Our instruments are tree ring measurements from Great Britain and its major trading 
partners. Tree-ring measurements reveal variations in climate conducive to cultivation that are 
obviously exogenous and highly correlated with the volume of commerce. When this instrument 
is used to identify the effects of trade on statutory authority acts in a standard two-stage least-
squares specification, the main results change little, indicating that the regressions identify a 
causal link between short-run changes in economic conditions and property rights legislation.   
 
5. Results 
This section presents results from the methods described in the preceding section. Table 5 
examines estate acts. Columns (1) through (4) regress the year-to-year change in the annual 
number of estate acts authorizing the sale or lease of land on year-to-year changes in the key 
explanatory variables, the real interest rate and the volume of international trade. The regressions 
span the 124 years for which we have data suitable for statistical analysis. The initial year, 1705, 
lies close to the point where Parliament formalized procedures for processing acts regarding   21
property rights. The final year, 1830, lies close to the nationwide reform of Parliamentary 
elections and procedures enshrined in the Great Reform Act of 1832. The standard errors are 
calculated using the Newey-West procedure for estimating a heteroskedastic and autocorrelation 
consistent covariance matrix. All the variables are stationary in differences.   
The table explores the temporal relationship between the explanatory and dependent 
variables. Column (1) lags the explanatory variables by one year. Column (2) lags the 
explanatory variables by two years. Column (4) includes both lags. The results reveal significant 
correlations for the real interest rate for both the first and second lags, with the second being 
stronger. Column (4) reports the sum of the coefficients for the change in the real interest rate 
lagged one and two years. The sum of this distributed lag (-0.51) is statistically significant, as is 
the F-test on the regression as a whole, indicating that estate holders and Parliament reacted to 
the changes in the real rate of interest over a period of two years. Columns (3) and (4) add 
control variables including years of elections, years in which the prime minister changed, years 
in which the monarch died, changes in the real land tax rate, changes in the tax code, changes in 
the onset and end of epidemics, and changes in the incidence of war. This spectrum of control 
variables improves the fit of the regression, but does not alter the results.  
An array of checks demonstrates the robustness of these regressions to a wide range of 
alternative specifications. Neither the signs nor the significance levels of the coefficients change 
when the endpoints of the analysis change by up to two decades. The signs and significance 
levels are also invariant to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables such as year-to-year 
changes in the level of population, industrial production, and Parliamentary majorities. Granger 
causality tests indicate that changes in economic conditions precede changes in legislative 
outcomes, while changes in legislative outcomes did not preceded changes in economic   22
variables. The results are consistent with our earlier findings: changes in the real interest rate 
Granger-cause changes in sale and lease acts.
8  
Columns (5) through (9) strengthen our results by replacing the dependent variables with 
placebos. The placebos include marriage, naturalization, office, and all non-estate private acts. 
The placebos resembled estate acts in many dimensions, but the placebos did not alter property 
rights. In all of the placebo tests, the dependent variable is uncorrelated with the real interest rate. 
This result has two important implications. First, the real interest rate influenced the passage of 
estate acts through demand-side channels, since if interest rates influenced the way in which 
Parliament supplied acts, then changes in interest rates should be correlated with changes in all 
types of acts, including non-estate private acts. Second, excluded explanatory variables did not 
drive the results in Columns (1) through (4). If they did, then the same patterns should appear in 
(5) through (9).  
Table 6 replicates these results for the years 1763 to 1830, which span the generations 
during which the Industrial Revolution began, spread, and accelerated. The years also span the 
period for which all acts are accurately dated and other statistical series pose the fewest 
problems. Columns (1) through (3) and (6) through (10) demonstrate that the relationship 
between real interest rates and the number of acts reorganizing rights to land holds for this key 
period and for the cleanest data. Column (4) shows that these results hold when the dependent 
variable is limited to only acts that authorized sales of strictly-settled land. Column (5) shows 
that these results hold when the dependent variable is limited to acts that authorized the lease of 
                                                 
8 The Granger causality tests are based on a vector auto regression (VAR) model with equations for the number of 
acts, the real interest rate, and the volume of trade. The equations include three lages of each endogenous variable. 
All test statistics, such as the likelihood ratio statistic, indicate the lag length should be 3. The p-value for the Chi-
square statistic on changes in the real interest rate is less than 0.01 indicating strong statistical significance. The 
VAR model also reveals that changes in sale and lease acts do not Granger cause changes in trade or real interest 
rates (the p-values are 0.86 and 0.14 respectively). Variation in acts is correlated with lags but not leads of our 
explanatory variables.     23
strictly-settled lands.  
Table 7 presents results for statutory authorities. Column (1) regresses the change in the 
number of statutory authority acts on changes in the real interest rate and the volume of trade. 
Column (2) adds control variables. Column (3) includes explanatory variables lagged both one 
and two years. Column (4) restricts the sample to the years between 1763 and 1830. Column (5) 
restricts the analysis to statutory authorities dealing with transportation (i.e. roads, canals, 
harbors, rivers, bridges, and railways). Column (6) restricts the analysis to statutory authorities 
related to the improvement of urban infrastructure and provision of urban services (i.e. the 
provision of water, sewers, market infrastructure, public buildings, gas lighting, garbage 
collection, church maintenance, courts of small request, poor relief, prison construction, and 
police protection). The results reveal a strong statistical correlation between economic conditions 
that influenced the value of statutory authorities and the number of statutory authorities passed 
by Parliament. In (1) through (4), the magnitude of the coefficients on our demand shift variables 
averages a little more than -1.0 for the change in the real interest rate and a little more than 1.0 
for the change in trade. The standard errors on those variables average about 0.36 and 0.34 
respectively. The small size of the standard errors relative to the magnitudes indicates that the 
coefficients are measured precisely. Column (8) examines the placebo group: changes in the 
number of government finance acts. The placebo is uncorrelated with changes in real interest 
rates and the volume of trade. This indicates that omitted variables cannot account for the 
observed relationship between statutory authority acts, real interest rates, and the volume of 
trade. A Granger test indicates that causation ran from changes in the volume of trade and rate of 
interest to the number of statutory authority acts.
9 
                                                 
9 The Granger causality test comes from a three-variable VAR model. The tests indicates that changes in trade and 
real interest rates Granger caused changes in statutory authority acts (p-values of 0.09 and 0.01 respectively). In   24
  Table 8 examines enclosure acts. Columns (1) through (3) illuminate the correlation 
between enclosures and interest rates. The reaction to changes in the real rate appears to have 
occurred over a period of two years. Column (4) examines the placebo group, acts amending 
enclosure acts. The placebo appears uncorrelated with the real interest rate, which suggests that 
the variation in the number of enclosure acts was not driven by unobserved factors that altered 
the costs of creating acts. 
  So far, our results illuminate correlations between changes in the quantity of legislation, 
changes in the volume of trade, and changes in the real interest rates. The direction of causation 
appears to be from economic conditions to legislative outcomes, but the results cannot rule out 
all potential counter hypotheses. We address this issue with the method of instrumental variables. 
The instruments are tree-ring measurements for Britain and its major trading partners. Tree rings 
are an ideal instrument because they were clearly exogenous. Tree rings reflected climatic 
conditions conducive to agriculture. Agriculture formed the foundation of the early modern 
economy. The size of harvests influenced the volume of trade and rate of interest. Thus, tree 
rings reveal exogenous variation in our explanatory variables. This variation can be used to 
identify the direction of causation.      
  Our analysis focuses on statutory authority acts, where clear results arise, probably 
because trade consisted largely of agricultural products and statutory authorities primarily 
financed improvements in transportation. In Table 8, column (2) reports results from a two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) regression of the change in statutory authority acts in year t on the change 
in trade in t-1. The second stage includes all the control variables in t-2 but it excludes tree ring 
measurements. The first stage includes the change in tree ring measurements for the UK in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
contract, changes in statutory authority acts did not Granger cause changes in trade or real interest rates (p-value of 
0.86 and 0.52 respectively).   25
years t-2, t-3, and t-4 and all the control variables in t-2. The estimated effect of a change in trade 
on the change in statutory authority acts is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. 
The coefficient is 1.76 which is larger than the estimate in the comparable ordinary least squares 
(OLS) model. The hypothesis that the coefficient on trade in the 2SLS model is equal to the 
coefficient in the OLS model cannot be rejected. This indicates that our OLS model is an 
accurate assessment of the effect of trade on statutory authority acts. 
  Table 8’s bottom panel shows that tree ring measurements are valid instruments. The 
lagged values for UK tree ring measurements are jointly significant in the first stage at the 10% 
level. Ideally, the F-statistic would be larger, avoiding a weak instruments problem, but the 
estimate seems sensible, given that many factors influenced the volume of trade and that climatic 
conditions influenced the economy with variable and extended lags. The over-identification test 
confirms our intuition that tree ring measurements were exogenous.  
  Column (3) reports results from an expanded set of tree-ring measurements including 
Britain’s major trading partners: France, the Spanish Netherlands (modern day Belgium), Silesia 
(modern day Poland), Virginia, and New York. The results indicate that exogenous changes in 
trade had a positive and significant effect on the number of statutory authorities. The hypothesis 
of equality between the OLS and 2SLS coefficients cannot be rejected. Concerns arise with the 
first-stage of this regression. While adding additional instruments improves the fit of the first-
stage (the R-square in the first stage increase from 0.14 to 0.31), the F-statistic falls, and the 
instruments no longer appear jointly significant. This appearance, however, occurs because we 
do not account for differences in the length of time that climatic shocks in various countries 
affected English trade. Controlling for these lags alleviates the problem, but imposes additional 
assumptions. We opted to report results with fewer assumptions.   26
  Columns (4) and (5) use the change in the real interest rates as the endogenous variable. 
The results resemble those for the volume of trade. The second-stage regressions indicate that 
our OLS regressions had little bias. Changes in real interest rates caused changes in statutory 
authorities. The first-stage regression indicates that tree rings are a valid instrument – tree rings 
pass both the goodness-of-fit and over-identification tests.  
  Column (6) reports results from a 2SLS model which includes both the change in real 
interest rates and trade as endogenous variables. The results resemble the previous regressions. A 
positive correlation exists between the volume of trade and the quantity of legislation. A negative 
correlation exists between the real interest rate and the quantity of legislation. Causation runs 
from changes in economic conditions to changes in the quantity of legislation. 
A series of historical examples strengthen our arguments concerning causality. The first 
is Lancashire’s turnpike building boom. During the 1760s and 1770s, technological innovations 
dramatically lowered the cost of spinning yarn and dramatically increased the production of 
cotton cloth. The city of Manchester was the center of this industrial revolution. In 1780, few 
improved roads linked Manchester to the textile towns emerging in its vicinity. During the next 
decade, localities and entrepreneurs sought to improve the road network. They could not do so 
without reorganizing property rights. So, a steady stream of turnpike bills appeared before 
Parliament. Most of the bills came in the years following surges in the textile production. In 
1792, for instance, the revolution in France and a blockade of French ports reduced competition 
for English manufactures. English imports of raw cotton rose and exports of finish cloth surged. 
In the following year, 1793, Parliament received a surge in turnpike proposals from the 
Lancashire textile region exceeding all of the acts proposed in the previous ten years combined. 
Within a few months, Parliament passed all of the acts.    27
A second example comes from London’s expansion during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, when London became the richest and one of the largest cities in the world. This 
expansion required agricultural land on the city’s periphery to be converted to residential and 
industrial uses. Existing property rights, however, prevented some of this land from being 
redeveloped. Prohibitions on selling land and signing long-term leases deterred development. 
Developers feared that they would not be able to reap the returns from investments and that 
successful building projects would be held-up after the fact. To solve these property-rights 
problems, holders of equitable estates sought Parliamentary assistance. Landholders did this 
more often when interest rates fell and profits from development rose.  
This connection is particularly clear during the 1750s and 1760s, when the Seven Years 
War and harvest failures pushed interest rates to prohibitive levels. Spikes in interest rates 
coincided with declines in the number of estate acts. In 1761, for example, because of the 
exorbitant yield on government bonds, private lending virtually ceased (Belcher, Cottrell, and 
Sheppard 1979, p. 186). During the next three years, landholders on London’s periphery sought 
few acts for reorganizing rights. In 1765, however, the yield on government bonds dropped to 
around 3.25%. A building boom ensued. During the next three years, land holders sought large 
numbers of acts reorganizing rights to estates on London’s periphery.  
The texts of these acts prove particularly illuminating. Consider George Forster Tuffnell. 
In 1766, Tuffnell held property in Islington and Holborn, just outside the city. From Parliament, 
Tuffnell obtained an act that declared  
“From the great increase of buildings which have lately been in the Parish of 
Islington…(Tuffnel) had a fair prospect and opportunity by granting building 
leases to make a considerable improvement and to increase the yearly 
income…But Tuffnell is, by the terms of the will, disabled from making and 
granting leases of any part of the said premises to any persons so as to encourage   28
them to make such improvements, without the aid and authority of Parliament.”
10   
 
So, Parliament altered the terms of Tuffnell’s estate, allowing him to sign 99-year building 
leases, which provided a contractual condition conducive to development. 
   How responsive was Parliament to changes in the demand for acts reorganizing rights? A 
few calculations reveal the answer to this inquiry. The sum of the coefficients for the real interest 
rate in Tables (5), (7), and (8) are -0.51, -1.14, and -2.07. Multiplying those coefficients with the 
standard error of the yearly difference in real interest rates (4.9) indicates that a one standard 
deviation decline coincided with an increase of 2.5 in the yearly difference in estate acts, an 
increase of 5.6 for statutory authority acts, and an increase of 10.1 for enclosure acts. Thus, a one 
standard deviation change in the yearly difference in interest rates explains approximately 35% 
(~2.5/7.2) of a standard deviation change in the yearly difference in estate acts, 29% (~5.6/19.4) 
of a standard deviation change for statutory authority acts, and 73% (~10.1/13.8) of a standard 
deviation change for enclosure acts.  Similarly, the standard deviation of the yearly difference in 
trade is 4.66. The sum of the coefficients on trade in table 7 is 0.99. The product of those 
numbers is 4.6. Thus, a one standard deviation change in the yearly difference in trade explains 
24% of a standard deviation change for statutory authority acts. Short-run fluctuations in trade 
explain around 19% of the variation in transportation acts and 25% of the variation in urban acts.  
In sum, changes in real interest rates and the volume of trade explain much of the annual 
fluctuation in estate, statutory authority, and enclosure acts. Parliament accommodated the 
public’s demand for legislation reforming property rights for families and communities. These 
acts comprised the preponderance of the local legislation passed by the national legislature. The 
following section concludes by considering how and why Parliament reorganized property rights 
and whether it influenced Britain’s economic expansion. 
                                                 
10 See Private Act 6 George III c.45.   29
  
6. Discussion 
At the opening of the eighteenth century, Parliament established a forum for reorganizing 
rights to land and resources. This venue enabled individuals, families, and communities to 
exploit opportunities that could not be accommodated by the inflexible rights regime inherited 
from England’s past. The process was rapid, affordable, and consensual. The forum operated 
elastically. When returns from reorganizing rights rose, the public requested and Parliament 
passed larger numbers of acts. Reorganizing rights in this way was a principal occupation of 
Parliament during the century preceding industrialization. From 1700 to 1830, estate, statutory 
authority, and enclosure acts comprised more than half of all legislation passed by Parliament  
These acts probably contributed to Britain’s economic ascent. The acts loosened 
constraints on investment inherent in Britain’s medieval landholding system, which could not 
accommodate modern economic opportunities. Parliament’s impact appears to have increased 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as the constraints inherent in the property-rights 
system became increasingly binding. Relaxing these constraints was probably a necessary 
condition for English economic development. Entrepreneurs, landowners, and localities would 
have forgone investment opportunities without alterations in their property rights. 
Statutory authorities played a large role in the urbanization and commercialization of the 
English economy. Statutory authorities provided fresh water, removed garbage, aided the 
indigent, operated forums for dispute resolution, and financed police forces. These services were 
essential for enabling large populations to live in small areas. Statutory authorities established a 
high-volume, long-distance transportation network. Canal companies enabled coal to reach 
emerging manufacturing centers. Harbor-improvements increased the number and draft of ships 
which could load and unload, facilitating the expansion of maritime commerce. Turnpikes   30
reduced freight charges and travel times by widening, resurfacing, and maintaining 
thoroughfares (Bogart, 2005). 
Estate acts – particularly those authorizing the sale and lease of land – exposed land to 
the invisible hand. Freeing resources from the shackles of the past loosened constraints on 
landowners, facilitated the reallocation of physical and financial assets to new and lucrative uses, 
and enabled the exploitation of opportunities arising in a dynamic economy. The lowering of 
transaction costs enhanced efficiency and encouraged investment (Bogart and Richardson 2009). 
The benefits of estate acts extended beyond the persons and property involved. Estate acts 
established precedents. Knowledge of what Parliament would decide when confronted with a 
case helped to resolve disputes within families, to safeguard the interests of investors, to 
determine the distribution of rents within ongoing business arrangements, and to prevent the 
holding-up of new projects by those seeking an inordinate share of the profits. The development 
of institutions solving such problems has long been considered to be one of the principal 
institutional innovations underlying modern capitalist economies (Williamson 1985). 
Why did Parliament establish such institutions when it did? The proximate answer is the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688, after which Britain became a constitutional monarchy, and the 
political system changed in fundamental ways. Parliamentary supremacy triggered transcendent 
political and intellectual developments. The Bill of Rights in 1689 (and subsequent legislation) 
encouraged the expansion of legislative activity. Parliament began meeting on a predictable, 
annual schedule. Parliament began setting its own agenda. Parliament established a permanent 
bureaucracy and procedures for processing petitions. Streamlined procedures reduced the cost of 
submitting bills and increased the predictability of passage. A cadre of professional solicitors and 
clerks emerged to help petitions through the Parliamentary process. By the 1720s, capacity   31
expanded to the point where the legislative process could effectively accommodate almost any 
demand for legislation reorganizing property rights. 
The political system that solidified at that time internalized a balance of political power 
between landowning, mercantile, courtly, and aristocratic interests. That balance enabled 
individuals interested in economic development to pass acts restructuring property rights and 
promoting economic progress. Political stability ensured that those acts would not be overturned 
by the ascension of new regimes, via either violent revolution or Parliamentary election. 
Parliament’s decisions became the law of the land. 
The security of property rights was not absolute. Parliament often amended ancient 
economic rights, if it felt that doing so contributed to the common good. Parliament felt free to 
alter rights regarding resources that could be put to more productive uses. Rights to property 
were secure, in other words, as long as property was used efficiently. Parliament did not, 
however, expropriate rights to land and resources without compensation. Individuals received 
remuneration for the rights that they lost. Remuneration typically left all parties as well off as 
before. Parliament, in other words, provided security for income derived from rights to property, 
but not security for the rights themselves. Rights typically defined who could use a piece of 
property, what they could employ the property for, when they could employ the property, and 
who would share in the resulting benefits. These rights were pliable. These rights could be 
altered by common consent and political decisions. This flexibility of rights enabled society’s 
institutional foundations to adapt to new conditions and emerging opportunities.   
The emergence of Britain’s system for reorganizing property rights coincided with an 
intellectual revolution called the Enlightenment. The essence of the Enlightenment was the 
notion that natural laws could be identified and harnessed for the betterment of society (Mokyr   32
2002, 2009; Mokyr and Nye 2007). Enlightened English thinkers such as John Locke wrote 
repeatedly about the appropriate role for government. In December 1689, Locke published his 
magnum opus, Two Treatise of Government. The second treatise focused on the concepts of 
property and legislature. Locke wrote that property should be used industriously and rationally. 
Rights to property formed the foundation for civil society. These rights existed by consent of the 
citizenry. That consent formed the law of the land (Locke, Second Treatise on Government, 
Chapter V, On Property, Sections 34 and 35). Locke’s concepts of property rights, civil 
government, and consent of the governed informed the individuals who reformed Britain’s 
political system in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth century. These reforms allowed all 
citizens (not just the King and his appointees) to utilize forms of petitions previously employed 
for the reorganization of royal estates, appointments to royal offices, and the assignment of rights 
to aristocratic estates and chartered towns. The principal modification of the old form was the 
addition of clauses indicating that the acts would enhance the wealth of the realm and enable 
individuals and communities to prosper. These clauses provide textual evidence that 
Enlightenment ideals influenced estate, enclosure, and statutory authority acts. 
Britain’s system for reorganizing property rights appears to be unique among European 
nations. In other nations, inflexible property-rights regimes prevented entrepreneurs from 
exploiting emerging opportunities. In France, for example, the sclerotic landholding system 
impeded the construction of infrastructure, such as canals, even when returns from their 
operation would have substantially exceeded construction costs (Rosenthal, 1992). The principal 
problem involved establishing rights of way. Local groups who opposed projects (or hoped for a 
larger share of the profits) could perpetually delay construction by repeatedly suing in slow and 
inefficient courts. Only after its revolution did France simplify procedures for establishing rights   33
of way. Britain established procedures for establishing rights of way more than a century before 
France and other countries on the continent. Britain created these procedures at the same time 
that Parliament established procedures for passing estate, statutory authority, and enclosure acts. 
We close by reemphasizing how our findings expand Coase’s insights into Parliament 
and property rights in industrializing Britain (Coase 1974). Coase argued that in a world with 
transaction costs, some distributions of property rights promote efficiency. Other distributions 
trap people in poverty. Parliament and common law courts understood this principle, and strove 
to assign rights in a way which maximized the wealth of the realm. The evidence presented in 
this essay shows that Parliament operated in this way since the early 1700s, a century and a half 
before the era studied by Coase.  
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Appendix: Derivation of Estimating Equation 
This section elucidates how to interpret patterns in the evidence. The exercise begins with 
intuition standard among social scientists. Private parties desired Parliament to pass acts. Their 
desires fluctuated as the value of acts fluctuated. Economic conditions which altered the net 
benefits of reorganizing rights propagated those fluctuations. Social scientists summarize such 
relationships with an inverse demand function. 
 (1)  () X q F p d d , =  
In this equation, pd indicates the maximum amount that the public would expend to secure the 
passage of a certain quantity of legislation, qd.  X indicates the array of economic factors that 
influenced the net benefits of legislation.  X ={x1, x2, …, xI}, where xi represents the i
th factor. To 
keep the notation clear, assume   ∞ < ∂ ∂ < i x F 0   I i ,..., 1 = ∀ . Since F represents demand, 
0 < ∂ ∂ q F .  
  The number of acts depended upon the time, effort, and resources that the legislature and 
bureaucracy expended in the approval process as well as political factors that influenced 
legislative productivity. The number of acts passed also depended upon the lawyers, lobbyists, 
and peripheral personnel that supplicants employed to prepare and advance their petitions. 
Petitioners had numerous routes for bringing bills before the Houses of Lords and Commons. 
Petitioners could choose among numerous lawyers that prepared petitions and approach any MP. 
We summarize this process with a supply function. 
(2)  () Z q G p s s , =  
ps indicates the costs of passing a quantity of legislation, qs, during a particular year.  Z indicates 
the array of factors influencing the supply of legislation during that year. Symbolically, Z ={z1, 
z2, …, zJ}, where zi represents the j
th factor. To keep the notation clear, assume   35
J j z G j ,..., 1 0 = ∀ > ∂ ∂ . In the short run, increasing the quantity of acts required more 
intensive employment of factors with diminishing returns and rising costs. So,  0 ≥ ∂ ∂ q G . 
  The interaction of supply and demand determines the quantity of acts that Parliament 
passes. This equilibrium occurs when the demand price, pd, equals the supply price, ps, plus some 
markup, m. 
 (3)  m p p s d + =  
If the markup exceeds zero, then someone in the act-passing process (either lobbyists, opponents 
of the legislation, or MPs) were able to extract some of the surplus generated by the legislation, 
and the equilibrium occurs at the intersection of the supply and marginal revenue curves. If the 
markup equals zero, then the act-passing process was completely competitive, and the 
equilibrium occurs at the intersection of the demand and supply curves.  
  Substituting Equations (1) and (2) into Equation (3) reveals the number of acts passed in 
equilibrium.  
   (4)  ( ) ( ) m Z q G X q F = −
* * *, *,  
Here, the asterisk superscript indicates quantities of variables in equilibrium. Rewriting the 
equilibrium condition emphasizes the implicit relationship between the equilibrium values of the 
variables. 
 (5) ( ) ( ) ( ) m Z q G X q F Z X q H = − ≡
* * * * *, *, , *,  
The implicit function theorem describes the relationship between the function, H, the equilibrium 
level of quantity demanded, q*, and the variables that shift supply and demand, X and Z. 
 (6)  ( )
* *, * Z X Q q =  
 (6’)  ()
()
( )











q Z q G q X q F
x X q F
q Z X q H
x Z X q H
x
q i i








   36
 (6’’)  ()
()
( )
() () * / *, * / *,
/ *,








q Z q G q X q F
z Z q G
q Z X q H
z Z X q H
z
q i i









  The total differential of (6) provides a linear approximation of the relationship in the 
neighborhood of the equilibrium. 




















* * * *
, * 
This relationship can be estimated with the data described in the body of the essay. The change 
in the quantity of acts, Dq*, is the change in the number of acts passed from year t-1 to year t. 
The changes in the independent variables, dxi and dzj, are changes in variables that influence 
demand and supply from year to year. The estimating equation is 






i t z x A ε β α + Δ + Δ = Δ −
=
−





where ΔAt is the change in the number of acts from t-1 to t. Δxi,t-1 is the change in the i
th demand 
shift variable from t-2 to t-1. αi is an estimate of  i x q ∂ ∂ * . Δzj,t-1 is the change in the j
th supply 
shift variable from t-2 to t-1. βj is an estimate of  j z q ∂ ∂ * . εt is an error term.  
Our estimates of  i x q ∂ ∂ *  and  j z q ∂ ∂ * do not allow us to recover the parameters of the 
underlying supply and demand curves, F and G.  However, proposition 1 indicates how the 
estimates enable us to characterize the shape of the supply curve.  
Proposition 1. If  0 * ≠ ∂ ∂ i x q  for some i, then  ( ) ∞ < ∂ ∂ * * * / , q Z q G .  
 







* * * =





q X q F




   I i ,..., 1 = ∀  because  ( ) q X q F ∂ ∂ / , * *  < 0 and 
() ∞ < ∂ ∂ i x X q F / , * * . 
 
Proposition 1 indicates that if the quantity of acts fluctuated in response to fluctuations of one (or   37
more) of the factors that influenced the demand for acts, then the supply curve for acts was not 
perfectly inelastic. Determining whether αi, our estimate of  i x q ∂ ∂ *  differ from zero involves the 
traditional hypothesis test for statistical significance. 
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Table 1: Estate and Other Private Acts, Summary Statistics 
   Δ Rights  Series in levels  Series in differences 
   Land Personal  Avg SD Min Max  Avg SD Min Max  
    Type of Acts  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)   
 
 
Estate  Acts                         
(a) All  Estates  All  Some   21.7 8.4  0  45   -0.2 9.6 -21  30 
(b)  Estates that authorizes sales  All  Some    11.2  5.0  0  29    -0.1  5.7  -15  15 
(c)  Estates that authorizes leases  All  Some    3.7  3.1  0  24    0.0  3.1  -12  16 




Non-Estate Private Acts 
                    
(e) Marriage  No  All    1.6  2.0  0  10    0.1 2.2  -9  7 
(f) Naturalization  No  All    7.7 6.2  0  36   0.0 6.9 -25  20 
(g) Office  No  All    0.4  0.7  0  4    0.0  1.0  -4  3 
(h)  Sum (Marriage, Naturalization, Office)  No  All    12.1  7.9  0  47    0.1  9.3  -34  26 
                                           
 
Notes: Column (1) indicates acts that changed rights to land and resources, marked “All” for acts that did and “no” for 
acts that did not. Column (2) indicates acts that altered personal rights, marked “All” for acts that did, and “some” if the 
act sometimes affected personal rights. Columns (3) through (6) describe the statistical properties of the original series. 
Columns (7) through (10) describe the statistical properties of the series in differences, i.e. where the observation in year 
t-1 is subtracted from the observation in year t. Columns (3) and (7) indicate the average. Columns (4) and (8) indicate 
the standard deviation. Columns (5) and (9) indicate the minimum value. Columns (6) and (10) indicate the maximum 
value.   43
Table 2: Statutory Authority and Finance Acts, Summary Statistics 
 
        Series in levels  Series in differences 
    Δ Rights 
To Land 
Provide 
I & S  Avg  SD  Min Max Stat?  Avg  SD  Min Max Stat? 
       (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
   
Statutory Authority Acts                   
(a)  All  All  All  50.8  41.4 0 187 No   1.0  19.4  -53 68 Yes 
(b) Transportation  Only  All  All  37.2 29.1  0  126  No    0.7  14.3 -37  56  Yes 
(c)  Urban  Only  All  All  9.8  10.8 0  53 Yes    0.2 6.9 -22 26 Yes 
   
Placebo Group                   
(d)  Govt. Finance Acts  None  Some  24.5  23.0  0  94  Yes    0.2  16.5  -87  54  Yes 
                                          
 
Notes: Column (1) indicates acts that changed rights to land and resources, marked “All” for acts that did and 
“none” for acts that did not. Column (2) indicates whether the acts authorized the provision of infrastructure or 
services, marked “All” for acts that did and “some” for categories in which some acts authorized infrastructure 
and services. Columns (3) through (7) describe the statistical properties of the original series. Columns (8) 
through (12) describe the statistical properties of the series in differences, i.e. where the observation in year t-1 
is subtracted from the observation in year t. Columns (3) and (8) indicate the average. Columns (4) and (9) 
indicate the standard deviation. Columns (5) and (10) indicate the minimum value. Columns (6) and (11) 
indicate the maximum value. Columns (7) and (12) indicate whether the series is stationary, indicated “yes,” or 
whether the series is non-stationary, indicated “no.” An augmented Dickey-Fuller test is used to determine 
whether the series possesses a unit root.  44
Table 3: Enclosure Acts and Amendments, Summary Statistics 
 
        Series in levels  Series in differences 
    Δ Rights  
To Land 
Correct 
Error  Avg  SD  Min Max Stat?  Avg  SD  Min Max Stat? 
       (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
                     
(a)  Enclosure  Acts  All  None 32.1  35.1 0 136 No   0.2  13.8  -49 37 Yes 
(b)  Enclosure  Amendments  Some  All  0.2  0.7 0  5 Yes   0 1.1  -5 5 Yes 
                                          
 
Notes: Column (1) indicates acts that changed rights to land and resources, marked “all” for acts that did and “some” 
for categories in which some acts changed rights to land and resources while other acts did not. Column (2) indicates 
whether the acts amended or corrected earlier acts changing rights to land and resources, marked “all” for acts that 
did and “none” for acts that did not. Columns (3) through (7) describe the statistical properties of the original series. 
Columns (8) through (12) describe the statistical properties of the series in differences, i.e. where the observation in 
year t-1 is subtracted from the observation in year t. Columns (3) and (8) indicate the average. Columns (4) and (9) 
indicate the standard deviation. Columns (5) and (10) indicate the minimum value. Columns (6) and (11) indicate the 
maximum value. Columns (7) and (12) indicate whether the series is stationary, indicated “yes,” or whether the series 
is non-stationary, indicated “no.” An augmented Dickey-Fuller test is used to determine whether the series possesses 
a unit root.  45
Table 4: Explanatory Variables, Summary Statistics 
 
      
Series in Differences      
     Avg  SD  Min  Max    Description  Sources 
        (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
                  
(a)  Interest Rate, Real    -0.1  4.9  -15.1  12.9    Yield on 2½ % consols minus inflation.  Neal (1990) and Clark (2001) 
(b)  Foreign Trade, Volume    738  4665  -24200  18300    Sum exports plus imports at official prices.  Mitchell (1988) 
                  
(c)  Election Year    0  0.6  -1  1    Indicator for years with elections.  H.HS (1993)  and Evans (2001) 
(d)  Monarch Dies    0  0.3  -1  1    Indicator for years in which monarch dies.  H.HS (1993)  and Evans (2001) 
(e)  Prime Minister Changes    0  0.5  -1  1    Indicator for years in which PM changes.  H.HS (1993)  and Evans (2001) 
                  
(f)  Epidemic Mortality    0  0.3  -1  1    Indicator for years with epidemic mortality.  H.HS (1993)  and Evans (2001) 
(g)  Land Tax Rate, Real    0  0.5  -2.1  2.0    Tax rate in shillings per acre.  H.HS (1993)  and Evans (2001) 
(h)  Tax Code Change    0  0.1  -1.  1    Indicator for year when tax code changes.  H.HS (1993)  and Evans (2001) 
(i)  War Years    0  0.3  -1  1    Indicator for years when Britain fights wars.  Rodger (2004), H.HS (1993), 
and Evans (2001) 
                  
(j)  Tree Ring Belgium     11.6  258.0  -1040  1190    Index. 0 equals no growth. 1000 is average.  Hoffsummer (1986) 
(k)  Tree Ring England    2.5  177.1  -468  496    Index. 0 equals no growth. 1000 is average.  Baillie (1986) 
(l)  Tree Ring French Alps    -4.0  282.0  -871  867    Index. 0 equals no growth. 1000 is average.  Tessier (1995) 
(m)  Tree Ring Pomerania    0.1  16.7  -63  61    Index. 0 equals no growth. 1000 is average.  Wazny (1986) 
(n)  Tree Ring New York    1.45  187.4  -495  493    Index. 0 equals no growth. 1000 is average.  Cook (1995) 
(o)  Tree Ring Virginia    1.4  196.2  -479  550    Index. 0 equals no growth. 1000 is average.  Cook (1994) 
                    
 
Notes: Definitions for Columns (1) through (4) identical to definitions for Columns (8) through (11) in Table 3. All of these 
differenced series are stationary. H.HS (1993) refers to the texts by Holmes (1993) and Holmes and Szechi (1993). 
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Table 5: Estate Acts, 1705-1830, Regression Results 
  Δ Estate Acts    Δ Non-Estate Private Acts 







Leases      Marriage  Naturalize  Office All All 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)     (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                   
Δ Real interest rate t-1  -0.22    -0.11          - 0 . 2 8  
  [0.11]    [0.13]          [ 0 . 3 2 ]  
                   
Δ Real interest rate t-2    -0.34 -0.39 -0.40     -0.03  0.11  0.02 -0.01  0.08 
   [0.10] [0.11] [0.12]     [0.04] [0.17] [0.02] [0.22] [0.27] 
                   
Δ Trade t-1  -0.03    -0.22          0.01 
  [0.12]    [0.14]          [ 0 . 1 4 ]  
                   
Δ Trade t-2    -0.09 -0.07 -0.10      0.04 -0.15 -0.01  0.09 -0.06 
   [0.17] [0.16] [0.16]     [0.08] [0.20] [0.01] [0.28] [0.28] 
                 
Control  Variables?  No  No  Yes  Yes     Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                   
                   
#Observations  124  124  124  124     124 124 124 124 124 
F-test  (deg.  freedom)  (2,113)  (2,113)  (9,106)  (11,104)     (9,106) (9,106) (9,106) (9,106)  (11,104) 
F-test  statistic  313 360 528  2945      19  53  13378 149 162 
                    
Sum coefficients on Δ real interest rate t-1 and t-2   -0.51             -0.2 
(p-value)       (0.002)            (0.37) 
                    
Sum coefficients on Δ trade t-1 and t-2     -0.32             -0.05 
(p-value)      (0.23)             (0.90) 
                    
 
Notes: Bold face indicates significant at the 5% level. Italic indicates significance at the 10% level. Standard errors calculated using the Newey-
West procedure with 3 lags. Control variables include year of election, monarch dies, prime minister changes, epidemic mortality, land tax rate 
real, tax code change, and war years. 
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Table 6: Estate Acts, 1765-1830, Regression Results 
 
  Δ Estate Acts    Δ Non-Estate Private Acts 





Leases  Sales  Leases    Marriage  Naturalize  Office All All 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
                   
Δ Real interest rate t-1  -0.32   -0.21  -0.02  -0.19        - 0 . 4 6  
  [0.13]   [0.12] [0.09] [0.11]            [0.50] 
                   
Δ Real interest rate t-2    -0.39  -0.43 -0.34 -0.09   -0.06 -0.01  0.01 -0.12  0.05 
   [0.17] [0.16] [0.14] [0.08]    [0.08] [0.38]  [0.03]  [0.48]  [0.58] 
                   
Δ Trade t-1  -0.05    -0.29  -0.14  -0.15        0.07 
  [0.12]   [0.14] [0.11] [0.06]            [0.15] 
                   
Δ Trade t-2    -0.02  -0.06  -0.15  0.09    0.03 -0.20  0.00 -0.18 -0.13 
   [0.13] [0.12] [0.11] [0.04]    [0.08] [0.22]  [0.01]  [0.31]  [0.31] 
                
Control  Variables?  No Yes Yes Yes  Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                   
                   
#Observations  66 66 66 66 66    66 66  66  66  66 
F-test  (deg.  freedom)  (2,64)  (9,57) (11,55) (11,55) (11,55)    (9,57)  (9,57)  (9,57)  (9,57)  (11,55) 
F-test  statistic  3 7 8 3 5    3 2  1  1  2 
                   
Sum coefficients on Δ real interest rate t-1 and t-2  -0.64 -0.36 -0.28           -0.41 
(p-value)     (0.003) (0.01) (0.06)           (0.23) 
                     
Sum coefficients on Δ trade t-1 and t-2    -0.35 -0.29 -0.06           -0.06 
(p-value)     (0.15) (0.16) (0.48)           (0.88) 
                     
 
Notes: Bold face indicates significant at the 5% level. Italic indicates significance at the 10% level. Standard errors calculated using the Newey-
West procedure with 3 lags. Control variables include year of election, monarch dies, prime minister changes, epidemic mortality, land tax rate 
real, tax code change, and war years. 
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Table 7:  Statutory Authority Acts Regression Results 
 
  Δ Statutory Authority Acts    Δ Finance 
  All All All All  Transport Urban  All     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   (8) 
              
Δ Real interest rate t-1  -1.00 -1.03 -1.00 -1.20 -0.56 -0.27  -0.87   -0.03 
  [0.33] [0.31] [0.34] [0.45] [0.20] [0.14] [0.26]   [0.33] 
            
Δ Real interest rate t-2      -0.14             
     [ 0 . 3 5 ]         
            
Δ Trade t-1  1.03 1.03 1.01 1.12 0.58 0.37 1.08   0.64 
  [0.36] [0.31] [0.35] [0.34] [0.24] [0.11] [0.39]   [0.53] 
            
Δ  Trade  t-2      -0.02        
     [ 0 . 3 2 ]         
            
Control  variables?    No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes 
            
               
#  Observations  124 124 124  66 124 124 120   120 
F-test  (deg  freedom)  (2,113) (9,106)  (11,104)  (9,57) (9,106) (9,106) (9,102)   (9,102) 
F-test  statistic  117 169  1237  8 255 482 169    26 
            
Sum coefficients on Δ real interest rate t-1 and t-2  -1.14         
(p-value)      (0.001)         
               
Sum coefficients on Δ trade t-1 and t-2  0.99         
(p-value)      (0.10)         
               
 
Notes: Bold face indicates significant at the 5% level. Italic indicates significance at the 10% level. Standard errors calculated using 
the Newey-West procedure with 2 lags. Control variables include years of election, monarch dies, prime minister changes, epidemic 
mortality, land tax rate real, tax code change, and war.   49
Table 8: Enclosure Acts Regression Results 
 
Δ Enclosure Acts    Δ Amendments  
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) 
        
Δ Real interest rate t-1  -1.02 -1.04 -0.81   0.01 
 [0.28]  [0.27]  [0.29]    [0.03] 
          
Δ Real interest rate t-2      -1.26    
     [0.50]     
          
Δ Trade t-1  0.45  0.43  0.26    -0.04 
 [0.32]  [0.34]  [0.32]    [0.04] 
          
Δ Trade t-2      0.04     
     [0.35]     
          
Control variables?   No  Yes  Yes    Yes 
          
          
# Observations  66  66  66    66 
F-test (deg freedom)  (2,64)  (9,57)  (11,55)    (9,57) 
F-test statistic  11  7  8    1 
          
Sum coefficients on Δ real interest rate t-1 and t-2  -2.07    
(p-value)     (0.00)     
          
Sum coefficients on Δ trade t-1 and t-2  0.30    
(p-value) (0.61)    
     
 
Bold face indicates significant at the 5% level. Italic indicates significance at the 
10% level. Standard errors calculated using the Newey-West procedure with 2 lags. 
Control variables include years of election, monarch dies, prime minister changes, 










   50
Table 8:  Statutory Authority Acts OLS and 2SLS Results 
 
    
  OLS 2SLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS 2SLS   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
            
Δ Real interest rate t-1       -1.12 -1.54 -1.28   
       [0.38] [0.68] [0.75]   
          
          
Δ Trade t-1  1.00  1.76  1.42    1.20   
  [0.35]  [0.96]  [0.67]    [0.66]   
          
          
Control  variables?    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
          
          
#  Observations  124 124 124 124 124 124   
F-test statistic first stage    2.45  1.38    1.79  1.47   
(p-value)   (0.07) (0.16)   (0.04) (0.05)   
 
Over-id Stat    0.96 19.01   21.40 17.23   
(p-value)   (0.62) (0.33)   (0.21) (0.37)   
 

















Number of lags for 
Treering data   3 3   3 3   
          
          
          
 
Notes: Bold face indicates significant at the 5% level. Italic indicates significance at the 10% 
level. Robust standard errors are reported.  
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